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Policymakers and the academic community have reached an in-
creasing consensus during the last two decades: the primary objec-
tive of monetary policy should be to control inflation (see, for example,
King, 1999). A less settled issue is the appropriate role of the central
bank regarding other, secondary objectives. Some countries have ex-
plicitly included unemployment (or the output gap) among the cen-
tral bank’s objectives, whereas others make explicit reference to the
output gap when explaining policy to the public. For example, the
U.S. Federal Reserve has among its goals “to promote maximum em-
ployment,” and the Reserve Bank of Australia has “the maintenance
of full employment” as an explicit objective in addition to price stabil-
ity. The Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of England, and even the Euro-
pean Central Bank have identified output gap volatility as a reason to
follow a gradualist approach to controlling inflation. For example, the
Bank of England has stated that, in choosing among various alterna-
tive paths to achieving the inflation target, the monetary authority
should be concerned about deviations of the level of output from ca-
pacity (see Svensson, 1999).
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But the output gap and inflation are not the only relevant objec-
tives of monetary policy from a practical point of view. The law that
establishes the Central Bank of Chile sets as a formal objective the
stability and proper functioning of the country’s external payments
system. Operationally, this objective has been interpreted as main-
taining a sustainable current account deficit. Specifically, there is an
operational objective of keeping this deficit, measured at trend terms
of trade, between 4 and 5 percent of GDP.1 Behind this objective is
the idea that an excessive current account deficit can easily jeopar-
dize the normal functioning of the external payments system, in-
cluding access to external financing.
Including a target for the current account deficit in the objective
function of the central bank has potentially important consequences
for the formulation of monetary policy, particularly regarding the
optimal reaction to various shocks. Both the magnitude and the per-
sistence of appropriate movements in interest rates following a spe-
cific shock can change when this objective is considered. This paper
investigates this issue, deriving and comparing optimal policy rules
using a simple macroeconomic model of the Chilean economy. It
further analyzes what happens to optimal monetary policy when the
current account objective is asymmetric, that is, when it is consid-
ered that positive deviations are relatively more undesirable than
negative ones.2
The paper first studies the problem of a central bank that chooses
interest rates so as to minimize the expected discounted loss of a
quadratic loss function in an economy described by linear equations
and in which there are some forward-looking variables. Although it
makes use of standard dynamic programming, the paper departs from
previous work by explicitly incorporating the current account in the
objective function and by considering a macroeconomic model whose
structure and lags are chosen to realistically represent the Chilean
1. See Massad (1998) for a description of the central bank’s objectives and of
the way monetary policy is conducted in Chile based on an inflation target. One
important feature of the Chilean economy in this regard is the widespread prac-
tice of indexing for inflation, including indexing of financial assets. In addition,
before September 1999 the central bank used a target zone framework as the
basis of its exchange rate policy.
2. Of course, it is quite difficult to argue from first principles that the current
account should be an objective in its own right. Ultimately, its inclusion is a short
cut to avoid a very complex model in which inflation and output are severely
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economy.3 The model structure is similar to that of a simple central
bank macroeconomic projection model. It includes equations for the
output gap, the absorption-output gap, a Phillips curve, uncovered
interest rate parity, and a term structure. Using this model, we in-
vestigate how optimal policy reactions change when the current ac-
count matters, and the implications of incorporating the output gap
among the central bank’s objectives.
The paper then studies the consequences of having an asymmet-
ric objective for the current account. This is done within a consider-
ably simpler framework, as otherwise it would be difficult to solve
the central bank’s problem. The economy is described by a central
bank loss function that depends on inflation and the absorption-out-
put gap, with two linear equations describing their evolution. Again,
the central bank has to choose interest rates so as to minimize the
expected discounted loss, this time of a nonquadratic loss function.
The solution method we use in this case is based on standard dy-
namic programming using a convenient discretization of the economy.
We investigate how optimal policy reactions change both with the
asymmetry in objectives and with uncertainty about future shocks.4
It is important to clarify at the outset that by an optimal reaction
we mean the best possible policy rule in terms of maximizing the
objective function in the context of the model under analysis. It is not
necessarily the best policy for day-to-day policymaking, because, by
definition, any model is an incomplete description of reality. Actual
policymaking might take into account these rules—indeed, they are
quite appealing as they give precise answers to a quite complex prob-
lem of combined lagged effects. However, policymakers should also
evaluate the implications of developments that are not considered in
the model. In other words, the optimality of the rules we study is
model-specific.
The main results of the paper yield relevant policy conclusions.
For example, we find that including the current account among the
objectives of the central bank has important consequences for opti-
mal policy reactions. Interest rates react vigorously (and without much
persistence) to shocks that affect the current account deficit, but are
3. Svensson (2000), Ryan and Thompson (1999), and many others study opti-
mal policy rules in inflation targeting frameworks for open economies. Among
other issues, these papers analyze the usefulness of monetary conditions indexes
and the merits of targeting inflation of nontraded goods.
4. Because with asymmetric objectives the problem is not linear-quadratic,
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less responsive to output gap and inflation shocks when the current
account is among the objectives. If the current account does not mat-
ter, optimal policy rules change considerably when the central bank
cares about the output gap. However, these changes are far less dra-
matic if the central bank already has the current account among its
objectives. An asymmetric current account objective does not greatly
change the optimal reactions to demand shocks, but it makes mon-
etary policy clearly more aggressive toward positive inflation shocks.
The change in this policy reaction is economically relevant. Finally,
when there is an asymmetric current account objective, a higher vola-
tility in current account shocks generates a more aggressive mon-
etary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the struc-
ture of the economy as modeled, as well as monetary policy objec-
tives in a standard linear-quadratic framework. Section 2 presents
the method for solving the central bank’s problem and compares op-
timal policy rules for alternative central bank preference parameters
using a realistic model estimate. Section 3 studies policy rules in a
simpler economy but one in which current account objectives are
asymmetric. Finally, section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
1. THE ECONOMY
The economy is described by a series of state variables, some of
which are exogenous, while others are endogenous, predetermined,
and subject to stochastic shocks, and the rest are endogenous and
forward-looking. These variables evolve according to a simple linear
macroeconomic model in which monetary policy affects some vari-
ables instantaneously and others with a lag.5 The exogenous vari-
ables represent the fundamentals for the economy and follow simple
stochastic processes. The economy is endowed with a central bank,
which has an explicit objective function. The frequency of the empiri-
cal counterpart of the model is quarterly, and we assume that vari-
ables are observed contemporaneously.6
5. The model we consider is not immune to the Lucas critique, although
expectations are completely rational and the public knows the central bank’s
objectives. However, the Lucas critique is not that relevant when policy shocks
are small (which is the case considered in this paper).
6. One way of interpreting this assumption is to consider that monetary policy
chooses end-of-period interest rates. An alternative is to consider that actual (off-
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All variables in the model are measured as deviations from their
(possibly stochastic) long-run trend and consequently are stationary.
For example, rt represents deviations of the interest rate with re-
spect to its long-run trend.7
1.1 Monetary Policy Objectives
The central bank has three objectives: to keep inflation close to
the target, to maintain the current account deficit close to a
preannounced value, and to keep the output gap close to zero. In
addition, the central bank dislikes large and sudden movements in
interest rates.8 These objectives are summarized in the following qua-
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where pt is the gap between actual and target inflation, cct is the gap
between the actual and the target current account (as a proportion of
GDP), and yt is the gap between actual and potential output.9 The term
(rt _ rt-1)2 captures the costs for the central bank of frequent and sud-
den changes in monetary policy. Lastly, mp, mcc, my, and mr are nonnega-
tive constants that together characterize the central bank type.
The central bank is forward looking and in each period t chooses
the level of the real (indexed) interest rate that minimizes the ex-
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where Wt represents the information set available in period t. More-
over, because there are forward-looking variables, both the central
7. See note 13.
8. See Woodford (1999a) for a derivation from first principles of these prefer-
ences for smooth movements in the policy instrument. Massad (1998) makes the
case for instrument stability in Chile. The concern of the central bank regarding
the normal functioning of the domestic payments system gives another argument
for such an objective.
9. In this framework the authority recognizes that monetary policy can have only
temporary effects on output. Moreover, there are no intertemporal inconsistency
problems of the Barro-Gordon type. See note 13.
(2)
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bank and the public know that the former can reoptimize in each
period. Hence, the only possible solution is a discretionary one.10
Therefore, the optimal policy rule has the form rt = FXt, where Xt
is the vector of predetermined variables and F is a vector of con-
stants to be endogenously determined (see Backus and Driffill,
1986, and Söderlind, 1999a, for further details).
1.2 State Variables
There are three fundamental exogenous variables in this
economy: the terms of trade (in logarithms) (tot), the country risk
premium (j), and the international real interest rate (r  
t *  ) . We
assume that these three variables are stationary (or that they are
transformed so as to eliminate any trend). Their law of motion is
given by the following equations:
, 1 1
tot
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respectively, where 0 < rj < 1 and x  j
t   are i.i.d. shocks (j = tot, r*,
and j).11
Domestic inflation moves according to inflation in traded goods
and in nontraded goods. Traded goods inflation, in turn, depends on
international prices and the exchange rate, and nontraded goods
inflation depends (because of indexation) on previous inflation, on
inflation expectations in previous periods, and on the output gap
10. A solution involving a commitment would attain a better outcome (see
Woodford, 1999b). However, like Svensson (1999), we assume that a commitment
technology is not available. Thus, the only realistic solution is discretionary.
11. A more realistic approach would be to model the risk premium as an
endogenous variable that depends on domestic variables such as the current ac-
count. Then an increase in the current account deficit would cause a nominal
devaluation following a rise in the risk premium. However, considering this pos-
sibility would only add an additional, indirect concern of the central bank regard-
ing the current account, without substantially changing the main results.
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(according to a standard accelerationist Phillips curve). In particu-
lar, the (annualized) inflation gap evolves according to






t    is tradables inflation, p N
t    is nontradables inflation, p  is the
inflation target, and w is a constant parameter. Tradables inflation is
determined as follows:
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where a'(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, et is the nominal
devaluation, p *
t     is international inflation, and x T
t     is an i.i.d. shock.
This specification assumes that the weak version of purchasing power
parity obtains for tradables (controlling for changes in value-added
taxation and tariffs) and that there is no instantaneous pass-through.
On the other hand, nontradables inflation evolves according to
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) , L ' | F E L ' 1 1 1 L
N
t t y t t F t
N
t y x + a + W p a + p a = p - + p - p (8)
where a'
pF (F) is a polynomial in the forward (lead) operator. This
means that  ( ) 1 1| E - + W p t t  is a predetermined variable in period t.12
Let us define the real exchange rate (RER) as  t t t t p p e q
* =
and assume, without loss of generality, that            . Then the inflation
gap equation can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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W p a + p a + a = p
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where aT (L) = (1 _ w)a'
T(L), apL(L) = wa'
pL(L) + (1 _ w)a'
T(L), apF (F)
= wa'
pF(F), ay(L) = wa'
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12. This structure is based on one of the projection models used at the Central
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in order to preserve homogeneity in prices we assume that
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) 1 1 ' 1 1 ' 1 ' = a w - + a + a w p p T F L . Notice that in this frame-
work monetary policy affects inflation through three different chan-
nels: the output gap, the exchange rate, and lagged expectations of
future monetary policy (and hence future inflation).
The RER is a forward-looking variable that is determined by the
uncovered interest parity condition:
( ) ( ) . 25 . 0 E 1 t t t t t t r r q q j + - + W =
*
+ (10)
Besides the short-term real interest rate controlled by the central
bank, there is a long-term interest rate determined as a forward-
looking variable in the bond market. According to the expectation
hypothesis of the term structure, the behavior of the long-term inter-
est rate Rt can be approximated by
( ) ( ) , E 1 1 t t t t R r R W l - + l = + (11)
where l is a constant that negatively depends on the bond duration.
The output gap has some persistence and reacts with lags to the
interest rates, the terms of trade, and the RER:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) , L
L L L L
1
1 1 1 1
y
t t q
t tot t r t R t y t
q
tot r R y y
x + b +
b + b + b + b =
-
- - - -
(12)
where x y
t     is an i.i.d. shock. This equation represents a standard
dynamic IS curve.
To construct the ratio of the current account (proxied by the trade
balance) to GDP, we consider a linear approximation that depends on
the gap between absorption and output (denoted by y d
t    ), the terms of
trade, the output gap, and the RER. A first-order (log) Taylor expan-
sion of the trade balance yields the following approximation:
, 1 0 0 t t t
d
t t tot k y k q k y cc + + - - = (13)
where k0 is the ratio of the trade balance to GDP during the expan-
sion year (2 percent in 1997), and k1 is the ratio of exports to GDPOptimal Rules when the Current Account Matters 73
during that year (30 percent in 1997). The current account deficit
during the expansion year was 4.8 percent of GDP.
Finally, we assume that the absorption-output gap has some per-
sistence and depends on interest rates, the terms of trade, and the
RER. In particular, this gap is determined by the following equation:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) , L
L L L L
1
1 1 1 1
d
t t q
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(14)
where  d
t x  is an i.i.d. shock. In order to be consistent with our prior
definition of yt, we consider  d
t y  as the gap between, on one hand, the
difference between actual and trend absorption and, on the other, the
output gap.13 Of course, because both equations include output in the
left-hand side, and both represent cyclical movements of the economy,
equations (14) and (12) are closely related. Thus the shocks  y
t x and  d
t x
need not be orthogonal. In the exercises below we consider both inde-
pendent and common shocks to both equations.
In sum, the economy is described by equations (3) to (5) and (9) to
(14). Appendix A presents the estimation and calibration results of
these equations using Chilean quarterly data. We choose a lag struc-
ture in each equation so as to maximize the realism and fit of the
model, even though this strategy generates several state variables.
2. SOLUTION
The solution of the model requires us to rewrite the model so as
to represent it in the state-space form. Once it is represented in this
way, one can apply directly the algorithms described in Backus and
Drifill (1986), Svensson (1994), and Söderlind (1999b). As mentioned
before, we consider a discretionary solution.
2.1 State-Space Representation
Following the same notation as Svensson (2000), let Xt be the (col-
umn) vector of predetermined variables, Yt the (column) vector of
13. In this framework, therefore, we study the effects of monetary policy on
the current account without considering secular trends in the expenditure-output
gap. This is consistent with the idea that the central bank is only capable of choosing
(temporary) deviations of the real interest rate with respect to its long-run trend.
The latter is actually endogenous and responds to the aforementioned secular trend.74 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
variables that enter as arguments in the central bank’s loss function,
xt the (column) vector of forward-looking variables, and xt the (col-
umn) vector of shocks. Considering the lag structure embedded in
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Let n1, n2, n3, and n = n1+ n2 be the dimensions of Xt, xt, Yt, and Zt,
respectively. In the particular model we consider, n1 = 17, n2 = 4, and
n3 = 4. Let Zt = (X'
t, x'
t) be the vector that describes the state of
the economy. Using these definitions, the model can be written in
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where A is a  n  · n  matrix, B is a  n  · 1 column vector, C z is a
n3 · n matrix, Cr is a n3 · 1 column vector, and K is a n3 · n3 diagonal
matrix with (mp, mcc, my, mr) in the diagonal. Appendix B describes the
construction of these matrices in detail.
The solution to the central bank’s problem is characterized by a
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rt = FXt , (18)
where F is a 1 · n1 row vector to be endogenously determined.
The solution also characterizes the evolution of the forward-look-
ing variables according to the following linear function:
, HX x t t = (19)
where H is a n2 · n1 matrix to be endogenously determined.
Hence the dynamics of the economy are given by equations (18)
and (19) and the following pair of equations:
, X M X 1 11 1 + + + = t t t ?    and (20)
( ) , X F C H C C Y 2 1 t r z z t + + = (21)
where M11, Cz1, Cz2 are n1 · n1, n3 · n1 and n3 · n2 matrices, respec-
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according to Xt and xt.
In order to find the matrices F and H we use the algorithm
mentioned above.
2.2 Optimal Reaction Functions
The optimal policy rule depends both on the structure of the
economy and on the preferences of the central bank. These prefer-
ences, in turn, are described by a discount rate and by a set of rela-
tive weights for the loss function in equation (1). We consider a
discount factor of 0.99 and four sets of weights for equation (1) and
thus define four types of central banks. The “hawk” type (H) has in-
flation as its almost unique objective; the “dove” type (D) has as its76 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
objectives both inflation and the output gap; the objectives of the
“strict condor” type (SC) are inflation and the current account deficit;
and those of the “flexible condor” type (FC) include inflation, the cur-
rent account deficit, and the output gap. We assume that all four
central bank types dislike large changes in interest rates and there-
fore have mr > 0. Table 1 presents the weights (ms) of the loss function
for each of these central bank types.14
Table 2 presents the optimal reaction functions for each of the
four types. Each column corresponds to the vector F', which, multi-
plied by the vector Xt, yields the optimal interest rate deviation for
period (quarter) t. For example, if the central bank is of the hawk
type, it will increase the (indexed) interest rate by 0.45 percentage
point after a 1-percentage-point upward shock to inflation.15
Examining the dynamic reaction of the interest rate to alterna-
tive shocks is another way of analyzing optimal policy rules. These
reactions show the path of interest rates that would prevail if the
rule is followed and no other shocks occur, and thereby include reac-
tions to expected future movements in other endogenous variables.
Figure 1 presents the path of interest rates between quarter 0 (on
impact) and quarter 7 following different exogenous shocks. Besides
the six basic (structural) shocks of the model, we consider a combined
shock to output and the absorption-output gap, which can be thought
of as the case of an overheated economy. The figure presents the reac-
tions of the four central bank types to such a shock. The panels on the
left show the reactions of central bank types H and P, whereas those on
the right ones show the reactions of types SC and FC.
14. The central bank preferences are “deep” parameters unaffected by the
structure of the economy (for example, the degree of indexation). The structure
of the economy modifies the optimal reaction functions, not preferences.
15. Notice that the interest rate persistence depends on both the parameter
for rt-1 and that for Rt-1.
Table 1. Preference Parameters for the Four Central
Bank Types
Type of central bank m p mcc my mr
Hawk 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.10
Dove 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.10
Strict condor 0.65 0.30 0.05 0.10
Flexible condor 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.10
Source: Authors’ definitions.Optimal Rules when the Current Account Matters 77
The results of table 2 and figure 1 have implications in at least
three dimensions (besides the numerical results, which may be use-
ful as a benchmark for policymaking). First, once the current ac-
count is part of the central bank’s objectives, optimal policy reactions
change in many respects, sometimes substantially. As expected, the
SC and FC types respond to shocks to the absorption-output gap and
to the terms of trade in a very different way than do types H and D.
These two shocks have direct effects on the current account, for which
the latter two central banks do not care. Interestingly, types SC and
FC are less responsive to shocks to the international interest rate
and the risk premium than types H and D, respectively. More impor-
tant, when there is a target for the current account, monetary policy
is clearly less aggressive in responding to shocks to inflation (com-
pare type H with type SC) and to the output gap. All these differences
are economically relevant.
Table 2. Optimal Policy Functions by Central Bank Type
Central bank type
Strict Flexible
Variable Hawk Dove condor condor
tot t –0.02 –0.01 –0.11 –0.10
tot t -1 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
tot t -2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
r*
t 0.87 0.43 0.52 0.34
j t 0.72 0.32 0.43 0.27
q t -1 –0.13 –0.06 –0.09 –0.06
q t -2 –0.09 –0.04 –0.07 –0.04
q t -3 –0.11 –0.05 –0.06 –0.04
pt 0.45 0.28 0.24 0.17
p t -1 0.32 0.19 0.17 0.11
p t -2 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.07
p t -3 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03
yt 0.57 0.60 0.31 0.33
y t -1 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.04
r t -1 0.28 0.12 –0.04 –0.07
R t -1 –0.27 –0.37 –0.15 –0.20
y   d
t 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.12
Source: Authors’ calculations.Figure 1. Reaction Functions of Four Central Bank Types
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Second, the results show that, in general, reactions are less per-
sistent for shocks that directly and indirectly affect the current ac-
count when the current account matters. This is probably due to
the relatively lower persistence in the absorption-output gap in com-
parison to other variables. However, the reaction to inflation and
output shocks is more persistent in types SC and FC than in types
H and D.
Finally, the differences in optimal rules that arise when the cen-
tral bank incorporates the output gap among its objectives are far
less dramatic when the current account is already one of its objec-
tives. Indeed, the differences between the reactions of types H and
D are considerably more important than the differences between
those of types SC and FC. One case in which this difference appears
most clearly is in the dynamic central bank reaction to an inflation
shock—probably the key issue in monetary policymaking. In this
case type SC is only marginally more hawkish than type FC. Thus
one can conclude that incorporating the output gap into the central
bank’s objectives does not appear to be crucial when the current
account already matters. The intuition for this result is simple: the
current account also presents a trade-off for monetary policy, be-
cause a more aggressive response to an inflation shock generates a
larger current account deviation. However, for this result to hold, it
is necessary to have a symmetric current account objective. The
next section analyzes optimal policy reactions when this objective is
asymmetric.
Simultaneous 1 percent schock to the output gap and the absorption-output gap
Figure 1. (Continued)
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3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH AN ASYMMETRIC
CURRENT ACCOUNT OBJECTIVE
Ultimately, behind the objective of keeping the current account
under control is the notion that an “excessive” deficit usually brings
about a serious balance of payments crisis, in which voluntary financ-
ing disappears and the economy enters a deep recession. The con-
verse, however, is not true: too small a deficit is not considered to be
a threat to external stability. But the loss function described by equa-
tion (1) is symmetric, treating positive and negative deviations as
equally undesirable. Therefore the rules we have derived are, by con-
struction, symmetric. This section investigates the implications for
monetary policy of having an asymmetric loss function for the cur-
rent account.
We analyze two issues that arise with asymmetric objectives.
First, we investigate how much optimal reactions change, in response
to both price and demand (current account) shocks. Second, we ana-
lyze whether optimal monetary policy changes when the volatility of
shocks increases. We evaluate both how policy changes and the eco-
nomic relevance of these changes.
Departing from the linear-quadratic framework (that is, from a
symmetric current account objective) has the benefit of allowing for a
more realistic loss function, but at the same time, it seriously compli-
cates the problem. In the linear-quadratic problem we were able to
find closed-form solutions of the form rt = FXt, whereas in this case
we have to resort to numerical simulations. To be able to solve the
central bank’s problem, we have to simplify the model of the economy
substantially. In particular, we calibrate a simple stochastic, two-equa-
tion, backward-looking economy with two state variables, namely,
inflation and the absorption-output gap, and directly associate the
latter with the current account deficit. For simplicity, we assume
that a positive absorption-output gap has inflationary consequences.16
Moreover, we do not consider any preferences over interest rate vari-
ability, nor do we consider bounds for possible interest rate values.
Thus the rules we derive will in general prescribe a more aggressive
16. It should be stressed that this is a simplification. There is no reason for this
gap to have direct inflationary consequences. What happens is that this gap is
usually highly correlated with the output gap, which does affect inflation.82 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
monetary policy than what a central bank would normally follow.
Accordingly, rather than taking the quantitative results we derive at
face value, they should be analyzed relative to the baseline scenario
of rules for a symmetric current account objective (derived from a
standard quadratic loss function).
3.1 A Simpler Economy
The economy is described by the following two equations:
, 1 1
p
- - e + a + p = p t
d
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where, as before, pt is the inflation gap in period t, 
d
t y   is the absorp-
tion-output gap, rt is the real (or indexed) interest rate (again mea-
sured as a deviation from its long-run trend), and 
p et  and 
y
t e  are
serially uncorrelated mean-zero stochastic shocks. The quantities ay,
br, and by are constant parameters.
As before, the central bank’s problem at time t is to choose a
sequence of interest rates  { }
¥
= t + 0 t t r  so as to minimize the intertem-
poral loss function in equation (2). Let xt be the vector with the state
variables, . We seek to characterize the interest rate se-
quence through a time-invariant (and probably nonlinear) policy func-
tion for a loss function of the following type:
( ) ( ) ( )
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where a, bL, and bH are positive constants. The asymmetric current
account objective is described by bL < bH.
Therefore the central bank’s problem is to set interest rates in order
to minimize equation (2) with equation (24) subject to equations (22) and
(23). We consider three alternative central bank types: quadratic, asym-
metric, and one-sided. Table 3 presents the preference parameters
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function, the asymmetric central bank cares considerably more about
positive deviations of the current account from its target than about
negative ones, and the one-sided central bank dislikes positive cur-
rent account deviations (and inflation) only. In all cases, on average,
there is a 2:1 weight relation between inflation and current account
gap deviations.
We calibrate the model using the following parameter values:
ay = 0.5, by = 0.6, br =  _0.5, S.D.(
p et ) = 0.8 percent, S.D.( y
t e ) = 0.8
percent, and zero covariance between shocks (where S.D. represents
the standard deviation). These parameters are approximately in line
with the estimation of equations (22) and (23) with Chilean data, with
the caveat that we use the output gap in the former equation (see
note 16).17 The frequency of the real-world counterpart of the model
can be thought of as being either quarterly or semiannual.
3.2 Solution
To solve the problem we discretize the economy along the lines
followed by Medina and Valdés (2002) and apply standard dynamic
programming techniques. It should be mentioned that this approxi-
mation yields quite accurate solutions for the linear-quadratic case.
Figure 2 shows the optimal policy functions for the central bank’s
problem under alternative combinations of inflation and the absorp-
tion-output gap. In each panel the x-axis shows a gap deviation, and
the y-axis shows the optimal policy reaction (given by the interest
rate deviation) of each of the central bank types.
Table 3. Loss Functions of Alternative Central Bank Types
Central bank type
Variable Quadratic Asymmetric One-sided
a 1.00 1.00 1.00
bL 0.50 0.20 0.00
bH 0.50 0.80 1.00
d 0.95 0.95 0.95
17. The estimation of equation (22) yields a considerably higher inflation
volatility. However, as shown by Magendzo (1998), in Chile there is close relation
between the level and the volatility of inflation. The estimation of the same equa-
tion using the difference between actual and long-run trend inflation yields a
standard deviation of 0.2 percent.
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The results show two interesting features. First, and more im-
portant, the asymmetric current account objective generates a more
aggressive response to positive inflation shocks. The intuition for this
is straightforward: there is no trade-off involved. The differences are
quite large. For example, if the current account gap is zero while the
inflation gap is 3 percent, a one-sided central bank will increase in-
terest rates by almost twice as much as the symmetric one, and an
asymmetric central bank will increase them by one-third more than
the symmetric one. In the case of negative inflation shocks, the asym-
metry generates a less aggressive monetary policy (higher interest
rates). Hence the two effects together imply that a central bank with
an asymmetric current account objective can end up having inflation,
on average, below its target.18
Second, at least for the case in which there is a negative or a zero
inflation gap, the asymmetric current account objective does not greatly
affect the optimal policy response to demand (current account) shocks.
The reason for this result is that even if an expenditure gap does not
matter directly, it can matter indirectly through its future impact on
inflation, especially when inflation has a unit root. This is not the case
if there is a positive absorption-output gap and a positive inflation gap.
In this case monetary policy is more aggressive because the no-trade-
off argument applies.
Figure 3 illustrates what happens to optimal policy reactions
when the standard deviation of current account shocks increases.
As one might expect, when the standard deviation rises from 0.8
percent (the baseline case) to 1.4 percent, the reactions of the
central bank are more aggressive against inflation. However, these
changes are not of great economic relevance. Only when the stan-
dard deviation rises to 2 percent do the differences start to be-
come important, although they still are less important than the
differences created by the asymmetry itself. In the case of nega-
tive inflation shocks, we find that a higher volatility of shocks also
makes monetary policy more aggressive. One possible explanation
is that when the inflation gap is very negative, a higher demand
volatility risks a movement toward an even more negative gap
(through a Phillips curve effect). Acting preemptively, when vola-
tility is higher, monetary policy tries to return inflation to its tar-
get faster. Again, however, the differences are not that relevant
from an economic perspective.
18. Of course, one can argue that the bias is for (not against) inflation if the
counterfactual is a central bank with no current account objective at all.Figure 3. Effects of Volatility on Optimal Policy Functions
with an Asymmetric Current Account Objective
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has presented two different models in order to analyze
the implications for monetary policy of having a target for the cur-
rent account deficit among the central bank’s objectives. The first
model is a simple linear-quadratic model estimated (or calibrated) for
the Chilean economy with several state variables, some of which are
forward-looking. The second model is a simple two-equation model in
which the monetary authority has an asymmetric objective for the
current account.
The analysis of this realistic linear-quadratic economy indicates
that including the current account in the central bank’s objectives
has important consequences for optimal policy reactions. Interest
rates become less reactive to shocks to inflation and the output gap
and, as expected, more reactive to shocks that directly affect the
current account. For example, the optimal reaction to a terms-of-
trade shock is completely different once the central bank cares about
the current account.
Furthermore, the results show that optimal monetary rules
change much less when the central bank incorporates the output gap
among its objectives if it already has a target for the current account
among those objectives. Therefore, although the discussion of incor-
porating unemployment in the central bank’s objectives is highly rel-
evant in Chile, it is considerably less so than in a country in which
the central bank has no current account objectives. Of course, this
result hinges on having a symmetric objective for something that
offers a trade-off to rapid inflation control.
The asymmetric nature of the current account objective has im-
portant consequences for optimal policy reactions against inflation
shocks. Compared with the case of a symmetric current account ob-
jective, monetary policy is considerably tighter when the objective is
asymmetric. When the volatility of current account shocks increases
and the central bank has an asymmetric current account objective,
monetary policy becomes more aggressive (that is, more reactive).
This last change, however, is quantitatively less important from
an economic perspective.88 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
APPENDIX A
Model Estimation and Calibration
This appendix describes the estimation results and calibration for
the Chilean economy of the model presented in the text. The data are
of quarterly frequency, and the sample size varies according to data
availability.
For the risk premium equation, we assume an AR(1) parameter
of 0.90, equal to that estimated for the international interest rate.
We calibrate the current account gap equation with a log Taylor ex-
pansion in 1997 (see text for details). We estimate the inflation equa-
tion using a specification in terms of levels, with international inflation
(which includes nominal depreciation, foreign inflation, and changes
in value added taxes and tariffs) among the explanatory variables,
and we impose homogeneity in prices. We then modify the equation
incorporating the inflation target and the RER. In the output equa-
tion we assume elasticities with respect to the RER and estimate the
rest of the parameters. Here and in appendix B we denote the condi-
tional expectation  ( ) t t x W t + E  as  t t x t + .
A.1 Terms of Trade
The estimated equation for the terms of trade is
3.7) (           (21.4)
0.53              0.86
.     1 1
-
-






tot t tot t r tot tot
The method of estimation is ordinary least squares (OLS), the sample
period is 1977 Q2 to 1998 Q2, and robust Newey-West t tests are
used. The 
2 R of the equation = 0.85, the F statistic = 237.4, and the
Durbin-h statistic = 1.19.
A.2 International Real Interest Rate
The estimated equation for the international real interest rate is
(18.8)
0.90
.   1
r
t t r t r r x + r =
*
-
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The estimation method is OLS, the sample period is 1977 Q2 to
1998 Q2, and robust Newey-West t tests are used. The  2 R of the
equation = 0.84, the F statistic = 443.0, and the Durbin-h statistic
= 2.30.
A.3 Country Risk Premium Calibration
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A.4 Inflation (Levels)
The estimated equation is
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The method of estimation is two-stage least squares (TSLS), the sample
period is 1988 Q3 to 1998 Q4, and robust Newey-West t tests are used.
The  2 R of the equation = 0.59, and the F statistic = 11.52. The inflation
target, wages, Rt-1 , and lags are used as instruments.90 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
A.5 Inflation Gap (Transformation)
The equation is as follows:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0.39                                    0.60
0.29 0.14                                0.37            0.20
. 2 / 3 /
            
  2 / /2
2 1 4 1







- - - -
- + - + p - p - - p - p
x + + a + - a +
p + p a + p a + p + p a + p a = p
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t t t t F t L t t L t L t
y y q q
A.6 Long-Term Real Interest Rate
The estimated equation is as follows:
( )
(18.8)     (2.1)
0.87     0.13
. 1   1 t t t t R r R + l - + l =
The estimation method is TSLS, the sample period is 1987 Q3 to
1998 Q4, and robust Newey-West t tests are used. The 
2 R of the
equation = 0.74, the F statistic = 110.1, and the Durbin-Watson
statistic = 1.64. Instruments used are pt,  d
t y , tott, and lags.
A.7 Output Gap
The estimated equation is as follows:
( ) ( )
.
2 / 2 /
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3 2 1
3 2 2 2 1 1
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The method of estimation is OLS, the sample period is 1987 Q3 to
1998 Q4, and robust Newey-West t tests are used. The  2 R of the equa-
tion = 0.57, the F statistic = 16.1, and the Durbin-h = -0.72.Optimal Rules when the Current Account Matters 91
A.8 Absorption-Output Gap
The estimated equation is as follows:
The method of estimation is OLS-PDL for q, the sample period is
1986 Q2 to 1998 Q4, and robust Newey-West t tests are used. The  2 R
of the equation = 0.49, the F statistic = 11.1, and the Durbin-h = 0.85.
A.9 Current Account Gap Calibration
The calibration of the current account gap is as follows:
0.30       0.02       0.02                     
. 1 0 0 t t t
d
t t tot k y k q k y cc + - + - =
The calibration is based on a log Taylor expansion with 1997 as the
base year.
A.10 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The equation is as follows:
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0.29 -0.91 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(2.4) (-3.3) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-2.0) (-0.3)92 Juan Pablo Medina and Rodrigo O. Valdés
APPENDIX B
State-Space Representation
This appendix shows how to write the model in the state-space
form. As noted by Svensson (2000), given rational expectations, the
inflation gap has the following behavior:
. 1 1 1
p
+ + + x + p = p t t t t
Moreover, shifting the inflation equation one period forward and tak-
ing expectations based on information up to time t, one arrives at an
equation that can be solved for  t t 3 + p  as a function of known variables
and of  t t 2 + p  and  t t 1 + p . With these considerations one can write the
matrix A of equation (15) in the following way:
( ) [ ]
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where Ej represents a 1 × n row vector with 1 in position j and zeros
otherwise, and Aj. is row j of matrix A. Furthermore,
( ) ( )
,
2 / 2 /
8 4 7 3 6 2
19 1 3 2 15 18 16 13 13
E E E
E E E E E E E A
q q q
q tot r R y
b + b + b +
b + + b + b + + b + b =
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The B vector, in turn, is given by
( ) [ ] . ' 0 , 0 , 25 . 0 , 1 , 2 /   0,   1,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0,   0, l - l - gr
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